Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, it aims to analyze the philosophical debate between Gadamer and Blumenberg concerning the notion of secularization, which, in the author's view, has received less attention than it deserves; secondly, it intends thereby to shed light on an ontological ambiguity in Gadamer's hermeneutics, unintentionally detected by Blumenberg in his reply to Gadamer's review of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. The importance of the paper is both historical-philosophical and theoretical: it spells out different aspects of a philosophical discussion whose relevance concern not only the secularization debate, but more generally the philosophy of history and the role of metaphors in understanding. The most relevant original contribution consists in the usage of Blumenberg's notion of background metaphorics as a tool for interpreting the role of the notion of history of effects in Gadamer's hermeneutics.

Keywords: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans Blumenberg, history of effects, metaphor, secularization

In his article on Blumenberg's notion of Umbesetzung (in French réinvestissement, in English reoccupation), Jean Greisch formulates two considerations, both related to Part I of the second edition of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (henceforth LMA in the main text), the monograph in which that notion has been most extensively employed.

The first of the two considerations, according to which a French (or more generally a non-German) reader of LMA has the impression of witnessing a "family discussion" (Greisch 2004, 279), is easily defensible, and indirectly confirmed by Robert Wallace in his introductory note to his English translation of LMA:

Die Legitimität der Neuzeit was published in 1966, the first major work of a younger German philosopher who, without being identified with anyone of the dominant philosophical schools in Germany, had clearly assimilated all of them, together with the historiography of philosophy, science, and theology. The book soon became the center of a widespread discussion, and it continues to be one of the recent works most frequently cited in German philosophical discourse. A second edition, substantially revised in order to respond to criticisms and dispel misunderstandings evident in the reviews,

In fact, a full understanding of the main topics broached by Blumenberg in the first part of his main work, and particularly in its second edition, presupposes acquaintance with a series of authors and notions related not only to the secularization debate, but also to other connected philosophical discussions that characterized the German philosophical landscape in those years.¹ Some of the main actors of that landscape are thinkers like Karl Löwith, Carl Schmitt, Odo Marquard, Rudolf Bultmann and Hans-Georg Gadamer.

Much less defensible is the opening statement of the second section of Greisch's article, dedicated to the second chapter of Part I of LMA, according to which, on the one hand, the title of that chapter ("A Dimension of Hidden Meaning?") is "enigmatic", and, on the other, this same chapter contains a "disguised critique of Gadamer's hermeneutics" (Greisch 2004, 284). Actually, the title of the chapter is an explicit reference to the first lines of Gadamer's review of LMA, where he defends the "legitimate hermeneutic function" of the notion of secularization, on the grounds that it "contributes a whole dimension of hidden meaning to the self-comprehension of what has come to be and presently exists, and shows in this way that what presently exists is and means far more than it knows of itself" (Gadamer 1968, 201–202, translated in Blumenberg 1983, 16–17. And in fact, Blumenberg thereby embarks in this same chapter on a critique of Gadamer's hermeneutics that is not at all disguised, being on the contrary based on an explicit reference to Gadamer's own review of his main work.

The importance of this second chapter of LMA consists, inter alia, in the fact that it does not formulate a critique of the notion of secularization per se, but rather of its supposed "hermeneutic function", as explicitly stated by Gadamer and implicitly assumed by other representatives of the secularization discourse (Löwith and Schmitt in primis), and as criticized by Blumenberg in the subsequent chapters. In other words, this answer moves within a meta-discourse, which to some extent underlies the following chapters of LMA, where more content-related criticisms of secularization are formulated. Besides, it is Blumenberg's answer to Gadamer's criticism which furnishes the elements based on which the very notion

¹ This point is stressed, among others, by Daniel Weidner (2014, 245), who also provides a synthetic and informative account of that philosophical landscape (ibid., 246–7). Robert Wallace, on the other hand, locates Blumenberg's argument within the wider theoretical framework of the criticism of modernity, paradigmatically beginning in 1755 with Rousseau's Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, and developed, in different ways and in different contexts, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. See Wallace 1983, xii–xiv.
of "reoccupation", appearing for the first time in Chapter 4, acquires its argumentative role in LMA. Conversely, Blumenberg's analyses of the notion of "reoccupation", formulated in different parts of LMA, furnish an implicit critique of Gadamer's hermeneutics, and more specifically of the conception of human history that, according to Blumenberg, is entailed in Gadamer's main philosophical work _Truth and Method_ (henceforth TM in the main text).

The main thesis of this essay is that Blumenberg's answer to Gadamer inadvertently reveals a sort of hidden ambiguity in Gadamer's conception of history. Accordingly, the essay will be developed in three main sections: in the first, I spell out the part of Blumenberg's criticism of secularization, as formulated in LMA, which constitutes the main object of Gadamer's criticism, as well of Blumenberg's subsequent answer. I base my analysis also on an important article, published in 1964 and recently translated into English (Blumenberg 2020), which constitutes one of the foundation stones in the construction of LMA, namely "'Secularization': Critique of a Category of Historical Illegitimacy" (henceforth SEC in the main text). In the second section, I refer to both Gadamer's criticism and Blumenberg's answer in order to detect in the latter some elements that essentially pertain to Gadamer's hermeneutics and that, nevertheless, are used against Gadamer's conception of human history, which, in Blumenberg's reading, should be characterized as _substantialist_. This point leads me to formulate the diagnostic hypothesis that TM contains a sort of ontological ambiguity: namely the fact of adopting a dialogical characterization of history (in line therefore with Blumenberg's approach) which is incompatible, however, with the historical substantialism it implicitly endorses. In the third and last section, I verify the tenability of this hypothesis, while also trying to provide a plausible explanation of the reasons for such ontological ambiguity based on Blumenberg's notion of _background metaphors_.

1. _Umsetzung versus Umbesetzung_: The Ontological Front of Blumenberg's Criticism of Secularization

At the beginning of LMA, Hans Blumenberg furnishes a more or less accepted definition of secularization, rather as if it were something that needs no explanation, as follows:

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2 For an identification of the main passages of LMA, where the notion of "reoccupation" plays a relevant role, see Kopp-Oberstebrink 2014, 355–356. The page numbers refer to the German edition.

3 Two things: First, in this essay I won't tackle the question of whether Blumenberg's definition is right or wrong. The key thing is that such a definition was in any case the
What the term "secularization" signifies should, it seems, be readily determinable. Whether as an observation, a reproach, or an endorsement, everyone is familiar with this designation for a long-term process by which a disappearance of religious ties, attitudes to transcendence, expectations of an afterlife, ritual performances, and firmly established turns of speech is driven onward in both private and daily public life. [...] In this descriptive sense one can cite almost anything as consequence of secularization, including specific losses, as, for instance, when someone says that the crisis of all authority is a phenomenon or a result of secularization. Something is absent, which is supposed to have been present before. (Blumenberg 1983, 3–4)

The first step to understanding Blumenberg's approach to the question of secularization consists in realizing that, in his view, such a descriptive usage of the term "secularization" may indeed be shortly criticized as indeterminate and as thereby allowing as an indefinite number of statements which are barely falsifiable: however, this first criticism does not constitute the main focus of LMA and SEC.

The second, much more extensive, criticism differs from the first one in two aspects: First, it concerns not the descriptive usage of this category, as quoted above, but rather its explicative usage:

Expressions of such a generous character, of such a degree of generality and intransitive indeterminacy, are allowed to pass, in our overrich supply of terminology, until almost without arousing notice or suspicion they present themselves in a more precise function. The world that became ever more worldly was a subject whose extension was about as obscure as that of the impersonal "it" in the proposition "It's raining." But in the more precise function, propositions of an entirely different form appear, propositions of the form 'B is the secularized A.' For example: The modern work ethic is secularized monastic asceticism; The world revolution is the secularized expectation of the end of the world [...] I am not proposing a linguistic prohibition here. [...] Only the claim to render intelligible by this terminology something that would otherwise not be intelligible, or would be less so, will be contradicted here. [...] The question how the term "secularization" [Säkularisierung] is used in texts of contemporary historical theory is directed, above all, at the difference between descriptive and explanatory uses. (Blumenberg 1983, 4–5, 9)

object of Gadamer's review, and this is what counts in this context. Secondly, Robert Wallace uses the word secularization to translate both the German terms Verweltlichung and Säkularisierung. Whether or not these two terms in Blumenberg's text are truly synonyms, as Wallace states (see the translator's notes in Blumenberg 1983, 11), plays no role in my argument.
Secondly, the criticism of the explanatory use is not that it is vague or indeterminate, but rather that it is simply wrong, as it misses its mark:

What emerges here is a precise usage of the term secularization, one that goes back to its original legal meaning and content, that is, the expropriation of ecclesiastical possessions as it has been practiced and referred to since the Peace of Westphalia. It is easy to see that there is an analogy between the usages of the term secularization recounted here and these processes of expropriation—an analogy that makes the idea of secularization liable to be used as a basic concept of historical understanding. For the time being, it should be quite coolly noted that a historical interpretation seeking to avail itself of the expression secularization bears, from a methodical perspective, the burden of proving that the features of the seizure are in evidence in the thematic process. Failing that, what emerges may well be a statement that sounds profound and creates the illusion of having understood something, but its grasp for a historical structure misses the mark. (Blumenberg 2020, 54–6)

The second step consists in understanding why Blumenberg considers such a usage hermeneutically inadequate. From the second chapter of LMA onwards, his argument is developed, in a parallel way, on two levels or fronts of criticism.⁴

A first front concerns a specific content issue, as consisting in the implied correctness of the analogy instituted between the literal (juridical) notion of secularization, referring to "the expropriation of church property," "so practiced and so named from the Peace of Westphalia onward" (Blumenberg 1983, 19), and its historical (explanatory) usage. The decisive point entailed here concerns the attribute of illegitimacy that is transposed, in the exercise of this analogy, from the literal to the historical (explanatory) usage of secularization, thereby delegitimizing a priori all the concepts or notions, which are claimed to be secularizations of something else:

[T]he example of the 'Final Resolution of the Reichstag's Special Commission' [Reichsdeputatwnshauptschluss] of 1803 established the term "as a concept of the usurpation of ecclesiastical rights, as a concept of the illegitimate emancipation of property from ecclesiastical care and custody." These defining elements make "the attribute of illegitimacy into a characteristic mark of the concept of secularization." (Blumenberg 1983, 20)

⁴ There is in fact a third level, related to the question of how it happened that we, "without arousing notice or suspicion" (see Blumenberg's excerpt previously quoted), passed from a descriptive to an explicative usage of this notion. This point will be developed in the last section of the essay as playing a decisive role in my interpretation of Gadamer's hermeneutics as ontologically ambiguous.
While this point is evidently of primary importance in LMA, as indeed seen in its title, it does not play a central role in the question with which this essay is concerned, so it won't be further treated.

A second front of Blumenberg’s criticism concerns a general, formal and ontological issue, as the legitimacy of the modern age is treated as a sort of case study for a more comprehensive question, thereby constituting a meta-level compared to the first one, related to the understanding of historical processes (Kopp-Oberstebrink 2014, 351)\textsuperscript{5} The formal aspect of the issue concerns the morphology of historical processes; the ontological aspect concerns the question whether such processes have to be understood in substantialist or functionalist terms. Accordingly, Blumenberg defines the "secularization theorem as a special case of historical substantialism" (Blumenberg 1983, 29). It can be plausibly stated, together with Robert Wallace, that this second point constitutes the very center of Blumenberg’s criticism of secularization, as "[t]he contrast of content with function is what ultimately distinguishes Blumenberg's model from the secularization theory" (Wallace 1983, xxvi). In any case, this ontological issue, in my reading, constitutes the focus of the Blumenberg–Gadamer debate, and will be therefore extensively treated in the rest of this section and the next.

Both these two fronts are activated in Blumenberg's diagnosis of the ontological implications of the explanatory usage of the notion of secularization. The main point in this regard is constituted by what Blumenberg calls a substantialist account of historical processes, which interprets some apparently radical changes in terms of transformation or metamorphosis of one single substance:

So simple is it, apparently, to identify the substance in its metamorphoses, and to line up the metastases relative to their one origin, once one has found the formula. Naturally its easy applicability and the consequent frivolous multiplication of instances do not speak against the procedure itself, they only make the examination of its admissibility, of its rational presuppositions and methodical requirements, all the more urgent. [...] For a usage defined in this way, what is called for is [...] evidence of transformation, metamorphosis, conversion to new functions, along with the identity of a substance that endures throughout the process. Without such a substantial identity, no recoverable sense could be attached to the talk of conversion and transformation. (Blumenberg 1983, 15–6)

We should now ask why Blumenberg criticizes such explanatory usage of the notion of secularization and the entailed historical substantialism. The

\textsuperscript{5} A double level for Blumenberg's discourse is also stressed by Robert Pippin in his critical review of LMA, although through a different argument (See Pippin 1987, 536).
answer consists in the model of expropriation implicitly adopted in such usage, as stressed in the excerpt previously quoted, and further articulated as follows:

The transference taking place here draws its assumptions from the *features* of the process of expropriation, which are:

a) the ability of the expropriated goods to be identified;

b) the legitimacy of primary ownership;

c) the seizure being unilateral. (Blumenberg 2020, 55).

All these three features are criticized by Blumenberg, both in SEC and in the first chapters of LMA, particularly in relation to the notion of modern progress as a secularization of Christian eschatology, formulated by Karl Löwith in *Meaning and History* (Löwith 1949), which constitutes a sort of *casus belli* of a conflict related to the "substantialist ontology of history" (Blumenberg 2020, 79) whose consequences reach far beyond the specific question of legitimacy of modernity. We can, simplifying, say that while the second and third features concern the question of *legitimacy versus illegitimacy* (the first front of Blumenberg's criticism, as previously formulated), the first one concerns the question of *substantialism versus functionalism* (the second front), which is the key issue of this section.

For reasons of clarity and space, I will articulate the Blumenberg's criticism of the first feature in four summarized points:

1. As already formulated in SEC and thereafter re-stated in LMA, Christian eschatology and the modern notion of progress show "a manifest difference", as the first one depends on "an event breaking into history" which "transcends and is heterogeneous to it", while the second one "extrapolates from a structure present in every moment to a future that is immanent in history" (Blumenberg 1983, 30).

2. The modern notion of progress finds its immediate sources in two main events which shaped the beginning of modernity: the idea of "the unity of methodically regulated theory as a coherent entity developing independently of individuals and generations" (Blumenberg 1983, 31), and the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*, which developed in the specific context of aesthetics, but which Blumenberg, together with Hans Robert Jauss, sees as the "aesthetic analogue of the detachment of theory from the authority of Aristotelianism" (Blumenberg 1983, 33).

3. This modern source of the notion of progress, however, *does not* yet explain its application to history as a whole, which produces a sort of "over-stretching" of the notion of progress "to the generality of a philosophy of history" (Blumenberg 2020, 63), in a way which is morphologically analogous
to the eschatological model, and which therefore generated the idea of progress as being a secularization of its (supposed) theological source. In this respect, "the formation of the idea of progress and its taking the place of the historical totality that was bounded by Creation and Judgment are two distinct events" (Blumenberg 1983, 49).

4. This overstretching of the notion of progress to the totality of history is explained, both in SEC and LMA; by Blumenberg through the key notion of reoccupation (Umbesetzung), which is Blumenberg's alternative to the notion of transposition (Umsetzung) implied in the very idea of secularization:

What mainly occurred in the process that is interpreted as secularization [...] should be described not as the transposition of authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from their origin but rather as the reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated. (Blumenberg 1983, 65)

Blumenberg's analysis yields two results: on the one side, the notion of historical progress cannot be identified as the expropriated (secularized) notion of Christian eschatology: they are rather to be considered as two distinct conceptual entities. On the other side, the notion of reoccupation, together with the related functionalist account of history, allows Blumenberg to provide an explanation of the morphological similarity between those two entities. In this respect, Löwith, in Blumenberg's view, provided a wrong ontological explanation to a morphological similarity that had been rightly detected:

The idea of progress [...] is viewed neither as a secularized Christian idea nor as a modern idea unaffected by Christianity; in Blumenberg's account, it is essentially modern in its content (the initial idea of possible progress) but heavily affected by Christianity in the function that the content is forced to perform (the function of explaining the meaning and pattern of history as a whole) [Wallace 1983, xxvi].

This articulated argument would be criticized by Hans Georg Gadamer in a review published in 1968 in the Philosophische Rundschau, to which Blumenberg answered in the second chapter of the revised version of LMA, published in 1974, which is nowadays the one usually read and translated. For the purposes of the present essay, the main interest of Gadamer's critique and Blumenberg's answer consists in the fact that Blumenberg uses Gadamerian notions and arguments to answer Gadamer's own critique; this will be the topic of the next section. On this basis, I will formulate the hypothesis of there being an essential ambiguity lying at the core of Gadamer's ontology of history, which Blumenberg involuntarily detected in answering his criticism.
2. "That was what I was afraid of": Blumenberg's Answer to Gadamer's Criticism and the Debate about Ontology of History

Gadamer's review of LMA is by no means a negative one: in several parts, Gadamer expresses deep respect for the originality and erudition on display in LMA, whose qualities exceed the expectations created by his already-published essays, which, in part, anticipated the themes treated in his main work. In three points of his review, however, Gadamer formulates concise yet penetrating criticisms, touching upon three different aspects of LMA:

1. The first criticism, formulated at the very beginning (Gadamer 1968, 201–2), concerns the very main topic of LMA, namely the critique of the notion of secularization, and contains the expression "hidden meaning" to which Blumenberg refers in the title of the second chapter of LMA (see above).

2. The second criticism, formulated a page later (Gadamer 1968, 203–4), concerns the usage of the notion of reoccupation (Umbesetzung) in Blumenberg's work, which, in Gadamer's view, recalls (without mentioning it) the methodology pursued by Cassirer in his historical-philosophical work (which configures the history of philosophy as history of problems).

3. The third criticism, formulated at the end of the review (Gadamer 1968, 208–9), concerns Blumenberg's reading of Nicholas of Cusa, to whom Gadamer had dedicated some significant pages of TM (see Gadamer 2004, 432–6).

Blumenberg addresses all the critiques formulated by Gadamer, although in different parts of LMA: the first critique is explicitly addressed in the second chapter of Part I (Blumenberg 1983, 16–19), and implicitly in other passages of LMA, which will be quoted in the remaining part of this section. The second critique is implicitly addressed in Chapter 6 of Part I (Blumenberg 1983, 65–6). The third critique is addressed in Chapter 1 of Part III (Blumenberg 1983, 476–80). While all three points raised by Gadamer, and Blumenberg's respective answers, are of high theoretical interest, in this section (and in this essay) I will mainly treat the first issue.

The main point made by Gadamer at the beginning of his review is explicitly quoted by Blumenberg in the following excerpt:

Against my critique of the concept of secularization, Hans-Georg Gadamer has asserted that this concept performs "a legitimate hermeneutic function." He describes this function of the secularization concept as follows: "It contributes a whole dimension of hidden meaning to the self-comprehension of what has come to be and presently exists, and shows in this way that what presently exists is and means far more than it knows of itself" (Gadamer 1968, 201–202). And he adds a sentence that is significant for his convic-

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tion of the epochal range of this category: "This holds also and especially for the modern age." (Blumenberg 1983, 16–7)

The first aspect to be noticed is that Gadamer, in a concise yet pregnant formulation, stresses three different points: first, by rhetorically using the same category as Blumenberg against him, he states that "secularization" should be considered as a notion which exercises a *legitimate* hermeneutic function, namely consisting in discovering a dimension of hidden meaning of historical events or epochs; secondly, this shows that the meaning of historical periods *exceeds*, so to speak, their self-understanding; and thirdly, that these two points are particularly relevant for the epoch of the modern age.

In his answer, Blumenberg also stresses three different points, which need to be separately expounded:

1. The first point Blumenberg makes is that Gadamer's criticism, and particularly the reference to a *hidden meaning*, activates a series of notions which essentially pertain to the tradition of hermeneutics, as a discipline concerning the interpretation of texts which "in general has only to do with a surplus of meaning over and above what is granted and understood as self-evident"; and, more specifically, it activates a model of understanding which recalls the Heideggerian notion of *philosophical hermeneutics*, according to which the notion of interpretation is extended from mere textual objects to the process of self-uncovering of *Dasein*. According to all this, self-consciousness is a "consciousness that is not transparent to itself in its substantial relations, a consciousness to which hermeneutics discloses its background" (Blumenberg 1983, 17). While Blumenberg in his text explicitly refers only to Heidegger, such considerations also essentially concern Gadamer's hermeneutics, as the following excerpt related to the notion of *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* (more on that in the last section) makes evident:

Consciousness of being affected by history (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) is primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation. To acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a task of peculiar difficulty. […] This is also true of the hermeneutic situation—i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the tradition that we are trying to understand. […] *To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete.* All self-knowledge arises from what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call "substance," because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity. This almost defines the aim of philosophical hermeneutics. (Gadamer 2004, 301)
2. The second point is condensed in the seven words quoted in the subtitle of this section: "that was what I was afraid of." With these words Blumenberg stresses that Gadamer's criticism is in fact a re-instantiation of the thesis that Blumenberg had already criticized in the first edition of LMA. The point at issue specifically concerns the relation between the "hermeneutic process of uncovering" (Brient 2002, 22) and the explicative usage of the notion of secularization. In Blumenberg's eyes, Gadamer's criticism is a re-statement of the historic substantialism implicit in such usage, because, to take the example of the notion of progress as mark of modernity, its hidden meaning is exactly what makes it illegitimate; this means that, in spite of appearing as a discontinuity with the notion of tradition and authority which characterized pre-modern ages, modern progress actually re-proposes theological notions (specifically: Christian eschatology) under so to speak non-immediately-recognizable appearances. This point is very well stressed in this excerpt from Elizabeth Brient:

The thesis that fundamental concepts, institutions and attitudes of the modern age are really just secularized versions of medieval correlates presupposes the identity of an originally sacred content or substance that is preserved (though transformed) in the transition to the modern world. It thus depends on an understanding of history dominated by the category of substance [...] The task of the historical theorist would then become that of identifying the core content, to unmask layers of "hidden meaning" or a series of "alienated forms". [...] The secularized idea is then understood in a deeper way or rather, truly understood for the first time, once its essential connection to its theological origin is made explicit. (Brient 2002, 21–2)

3. The third point made by Blumenberg consists in radically questioning such historical substantialism, the historical ontology implied by the notion of secularization, which is the reason why Gadamer's point is what Blumenberg was afraid of:

The alienation of a historical substance from its origin, which it carries with it only as a hidden dimension of meaning, unavoidably raises the question whether this is a process of self-alienation or externally induced deformation. (Blumenberg 1983, 18)

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6 The question of whether Blumenberg's reading of secularization as implying historical substantialism is correct here remains open, and I won't take a position on the notion of secularization itself. I will simply mention that Blumenberg supports his reading by a series of quotes that are, in my view, and at least in the first instance, quite convincing (see particularly the quote from Delekat 1958 in Blumenberg 1983, 24).
Here Wallace translates as "self-alienation" and "externally induced deformation" the German words Selbstantfremdung and Fremdverformung respectively. The common root fremd ("alien" or "foreign"), included in both words, makes lexically evident the two opposite configurations: while in the second case we are concerned with the interaction of two distinct individuals that are foreign to themselves, in the first case we are concerned with the movement of one individual in a foreign territory or element (the typical movement of alienation, related to the notion of secularization).

The conceptual articulation of the process of Fremdverformung is one of the main theoretical achievements of LMA and constitutes Blumenberg's alternative to the historical substantialism, implicit in the explicative usage of the notion of secularization and re-affirmed by Gadamer's endorsement of its hermeneutic legitimacy, as uncovering a hidden meaning of historical epochs.

For reasons of both clarity and synthesis, I will, further, articulate and condense Blumenberg's theoretical approach in three main points, based on some key passages of LMA:

1. The first step consists in passing from historical substantialism to historical functionalism: different conceptual contents can have identical functions, and so appear to be two instances of the same type (while in the case of secularization the second, secularized instance is regarded as a disguised copy of the first, original one):

   The only reason why 'secularization' could ever have become so plausible as a mode of explanation of historical processes is that supposedly secularized ideas can in fact mostly be traced back to an identity in the historical process. Of course this identity, according to the thesis advocated here, is not one of contents but one of functions. (Blumenberg 1983, 64)

2. Such historical functionalism entails the notion of reoccupation (Umbesetzung), which Blumenberg opposes to the notion of transposition (Umsetzung), this latter being the one entailed by historical substantialism: while in the latter case, we have an identical content which is transposed into another (secularized) context, in the first case we have an identical function, left empty, we can provocatively say, by a delegitimation of an existing notion (Christian eschatology), and reoccupied by a new one (modern progress), whose content is different from the first one:

   It is in fact possible for totally heterogeneous contents to take on identical functions in specific positions in the system of man's interpretation of the world and of himself. In our history this system has been decisively determined by Christian theology, and specifically, above all, in the direction of its expansion. Theology created new 'positions' in the framework of the
statements about the world and man that are possible and are expected, 'positions' that cannot simply be 'set aside' again or left unoccupied in the interest of theoretical economy. [...] What mainly occurred in the process that is interpreted as secularization, at least (so far) in all but a few recognizable and specific instances, should be described not as the transposition [Umsetzung] of authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from their origin but rather as the reoccupation [Umbesetzung] of answer positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated. (Blumenberg 1983, 64–5)

3. Such a theoretical framework is activated by a dialogical attitude adopted with respect to historical contents and functions: the identification of a function left empty and to be reoccupied is made possible by a sort of dialogical glance at the past, whereas delegitimated notions are read as inadequate answers to historical questions which remain open, as a sort of residuum of the process of critique, thereby needing a new, more adequate answer (the new content occupying the empty function):

The insight that all logic, both historically and systematically, is based on structures of dialogue has not yet been brought to bear in the construction of historical categories. If the modern age was not the monologue, beginning at point zero, of the absolute subject—as it pictures itself—but rather the system of efforts to answer in a new context questions that were posed to man in the Middle Ages, then this would entail new standards for interpreting what does in fact function as an answer to a question but does not represent itself as such an answer and may even conceal the fact that that is what it is. Every occurrence [Ereignis], in the widest sense of the term, is characterized by 'correspondence'; it responds to a question, a challenge, a discomfort; it bridges over an inconsistency, relaxes a tension, or occupies a vacant position. (Blumenberg 1983, 379)

Now the question I intend to stress at the end of this second section, and as an introduction to the next and final one, is the following: the notion of dialogue is, with no doubt, part of the theoretical backbone of Gadamer's hermeneutical and historical approach. Not only is the last sub-chapter of the second part of TM, which introduces to the last and conclusive part, dedicated to "The hermeneutic priority of the question", but it can be stated that the notion of dialogue is central to the whole of Gadamer's hermeneutical approach, and constitutes one of the elements of novelty compared to his predecessor Heidegger, to whom he is nevertheless in debt in many other respects. In Gadamer, understanding is always presupposing intersubjectivity, not in the Heideggerian deceived form of the "they" (Man), but rather in the authentic form of the Socratic dialogue, as testified by the closing sentence of the second section of TM:
To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were. (Gadamer 2004, 371)

Accordingly, in order to criticize Gadamer's review of LMA, a review which, as previously stressed, activates some central notions of his hermeneutics, Blumenberg employs a series of other notions that also essentially pertain to Gadamer's hermeneutical approach. What we want to investigate in the next and final section is whether such a paradoxical situation can be interpreted as a symptom of a sort of ontological ambiguity implicit in the whole approach of TM, and which Blumenberg's answer to Gadamer has, involuntarily, made explicit.

3. Dialogical Understanding and Wirkungsgeschichte: An Ontological Ambiguity at the Core of Gadamer's Hermeneutics as an Effect of Background Metaphorics

While Kant's Critique of Judgment and Gadamer's Truth and Method evidently have different structures and contents, they share however an important and not negligible trait: the fact of treating in the same work the domain of aesthetics on the one hand, and on the other a domain which cannot be reduced to simple causal relations, and which thus in some sense transcends the notion of mechanism: the domain of biology, in the case of Kant; that of history, in the case of Gadamer. The notion which allows them to treat such heterogeneous domains within the same argument is, in the case of Kant, that of reflective judgment, and in the case of Gadamer that of understanding.

Accordingly, when Gadamer affirms in the last part of the second section of TM that "the hermeneutic phenomenon […] implies the primacy of dialogue and the structure of question and answer" and that "the logic of the human sciences is a logic of the question" (Gadamer 2004, 363), he refers not only to the understanding of texts, but also to the understanding of history. The dialogical structure of understanding goes beyond the domain of interpretation of texts, the original domain of hermeneutics, to potentially inform all the domains of human knowledge, and eminently that of human history.

This point becomes evident when, in that same section, Gadamer criticizes Collingwood's philosophy of history:

It is like understanding works of art. A work of art can be understood only if we assume its adequacy as an expression of the artistic idea. Here too we have to discover the question which it answers, if we are to understand it as an answer. This is, in fact, an axiom of all hermeneutics: we described it above as the "fore-conception of completeness." For Collingwood, this is
the nerve of all historical knowledge. The historical method requires that
the logic of question and answer be applied to historical tradition. We will
understand historical events only if we reconstruct the question to which
the historical actions of the persons involved were the answer. (Gadamer
2004, 364)

Gadamer's criticism concerns both the artistic and the historical domain,
and is a radical denial of Collingwood's intentionalism:

Collingwood’s use of the logic of question and answer in hermeneutical
theory is made ambiguous by this extrapolation. Our understanding of written
tradition per se is not such that we can simply presuppose that the meaning we
discover in it agrees with what its author intended. Just as the events of history
do not in general manifest any agreement with the subjective ideas of the person
who stands and acts within history, so the sense of a text in general reaches far
beyond what its author originally intended. The task of understanding is con-
cerned above all with the meaning of the text itself. (Gadamer 2004, 365)

The hermeneutic value of historical distance is in fact more evident in the
understanding of historical facts than in that of artworks: it is only when histori-
cal facts lie at a certain distance that we are able to detect their meaning inde-
pendently from the intentions of the respective actors. This process, according
to Gadamer, articulates also the constitution of historical traditions, as "preser-
vation" which is also an "act of reason" (Gadamer 2004, 282).

As one can easily see, Gadamer's approach is fully compatible with his
endorsement of the secularization thesis: on the one side, the understanding that
modernity has of itself, i.e. as breaking with the principle of authority and there-
by building anew, does not have to coincide with what in fact modernity is, and
which can be detected possibly only when we start to see modernity from a
certain historical distance; on the other side, the notion of modern progress as
secularized Christian eschatology constitutes a paradigmatic example of how a
tradition maintains itself, in spite of the different stages of the process which
actualize different elements of it.

So, the question to be asked is why, despite sharing the same understand-
ing of history in terms of dialogical process, Blumenberg and Gadamer can arrive
at opposite conclusions. In the case of Gadamer, what is at stake with this question
is something which goes beyond the specific topic of secularization and which
concerns rather his conservatism—the term used by Habermas in order to charac-
terize Gadamer's hermeneutic position, in a notorious exchange between the two
thinkers (Apel et al., ed. 1971). The different aspects of this philosophical debate,
whose theoretical relevance seems to me increasingly evident even though more
than half a century has now gone by, has been widely commented upon and can-
not be broached here, not even in very general terms (see Warnke 1987, and Harrington 2001). One point, however, stressed by Georgia Warnke in the following excerpt, is important for the argument I intend to develop:

Gadamer's thesis here is the fundamentally conservative one that since we are historically finite, since we have no concept of rationality that is independent of the tradition to which we belong and hence no universal norms and principles to which we can appeal, we ought not even to attempt to overthrow the authority of that tradition. This thesis goes beyond his hermeneutic claim that in any attempt to overthrow tradition (whether artistic, epistemological or political) we accept more than we deny and more, perhaps, than we are willing to admit. Here his position is that since we cannot justify revolutionary practice absolutely, through recourse to transhistorically valid principles, we ought to dispense with it entirely. Even if one rejects Habermas's attempt to found a modern correlate to the Enlightenment's appeal to reason in the universal pragmatics of language, Gadamer's position does not seem to follow. Failure to find axiomatic grounds for our criticism of authority does not mean that we must submit dogmatically to it. (Warnke 1987, 136)

In the following pages of her study, Warnke shows how such a dogmatic reading of Gadamer's hermeneutic approach does not take into consideration some non-dogmatic implications of his dialogical notion of consensus, according to which consensus is not conceived simply as reaching an agreement, but rather as taking into account other points of view, which will lead in any case to an enrichment of its own position. Thereby, according to Warnke, "it follows that we are not limited to the premises of our tradition but rather continually revise them in the encounters with and discussions we have of them. In confronting other cultures, other prejudices and, indeed, the implications that others draw from our own traditions we learn to reflect on both our assumptions and our ideas of reason and to amend them in the direction of a better account" (Warnke 1987, 170). According to such a reading, it seems to me, Gadamer's approach is reformist rather than dogmatic, as traditions are both constituted and renovated through the same dialogic process.

The point that I intend to make in the last part of this essay is the following: while reformism is not dogmatism, it remains in any case a form of conservatism. In my view, while endorsing Warnke's reading of Gadamer's account of dialogical agreement as not entailing authoritarianism or dogmatism, it is not so evident that the result of such agreement should be the renovation or amendment of a tradition rather than a break with it. In fact, this is the very point made by Blumenberg when he criticizes the explicative usage of the notion of secularization, by opposing historical functionalism to substantialism. The risk implic-
Itly stressed by Blumenberg, it seems to me, is that of ontological stipulation: when we consider, for example, the notion of progress as the secularization of providence, we stipulate that an existing tradition is being amended and renovated through the secularization of one of its key concepts—whether for better or for worse is not my point here. In the same vein, to assume that in the dialogical exercise the comprehension of the reason of the other should produce a sort of common revision and agreement, is also, to be fair, a stipulation (see Habermas's later account of this point): many dialogues (including the one between Gadamer and Blumenberg) have as their legitimate result the clarification of the incompatibility of the different points of view. In some cases, the dialogical process is exactly the opposite of the one envisaged by Gadamer. We start a dialogue assuming that our points of view are in principle compatible, and in the end, thanks to (and not in spite of) the dialogical exercise, we arrive at the conclusion that our positions are not compatible, and that we have to break, for example, with a position that we assumed could have been amended.

So now the question should be cast in the following terms: what made Gadamer implicitly assume that the good dialogue should produce agreement and not disagreement, thereby enabling, so to say, a priori the maintenance of a tradition by its internal amendments? The answer I intend to propose will consist in a Blumenbergian reading of one of Gadamer's key concepts, namely the "history of effects" (Wirkungsgeschichte).

The notion of "history of effects" is generally considered an essential element of the theoretical backbone of Gadamer's hermeneutical approach: it has been defined as "a notion unsurpassable in importance in Truth and Method" constituting "the true speculative summit of the work" (Grondin 2003, 90), "core constituent of Gadamer's theory of hermeneutic experience" (Gander 2011, 93), as well as "the central point around which the theoretical part of Truth and Method turns" (Di Cesare 2013, 93).

As is well known, the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte was not devised by Gadamer, and indeed "was already widespread in the literary criticism of the nineteenth century. It refers to the auxiliary discipline that deals with the reception of a work and, above all, with the interpretations that have arisen in the reception" (Di Cesare 2013, 93). What Gadamer did was to extend the usage of this notion to a potentially universal domain: somehow, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality" (Habermas 1980) is also a claim to universality for the history of effects. What all this can signify, particularly in the domain of historical knowledge, is very well illustrated by Jean Grondin:

Along the thread of reception, every work and every event (the French revolution, the discovery of America, etc.) is enriched with new meanings and
new relevances that are determined by the attempts of their historical context of reception, and also by the previous interpretations to which they react. For example, in 1992, in the quincentennial celebrations of the discovery of America, we no longer always saw, as had been the case in previous commemorations, the glories of European civilization being spread to barbarians, but instead, in reaction to this history of conquest, the discovery of America was interpreted as the beginning of the annihilation of non-European civilizations. (Grondin 2003, 91)

Gadamer's next step consists in further extending such a notion from the understanding of historical facts to, so to speak, our congenitally historical forms of life, as the way in which we all stand within historical tradition. The history of effects is thereby the process by which the historical traditions renovate themselves, remaining alive in the process of history:

Historical tradition can be understood only as something always in the process of being defined by the course of events. Similarly, the philologist dealing with poetic or philosophical texts knows that they are inexhaustible. In both cases it is the course of events that brings out new aspects of meaning in historical material. [...] This is what we described as the history of effect as an element in hermeneutical experience. Every actualization in understanding can be regarded as a historical potential of what is understood. It is part of the historical finitude of our being that we are aware that others after us will understand in a different way. And yet it is equally indubitable that it remains the same work whose fullness of meaning is realized in the changing process of understanding, just as it is the same history whose meaning is constantly in the process of being defined. (Gadamer 2004, 366)

It is at this point that I intend to provide a reading of such a notion, and particularly its universal usage in Gadamer's hermeneutic approach. The first point to be stressed is what, in my view, proves most problematic in the last quoted excerpt. The usage of the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte in order to explain our way of dealing with historical facts can be plausibly be seen as implicitly adopting the metaphor of the world as text to be understood: while Gadamer's conception of reading and understanding (which here cannot be spelled out, not even summarily, for reasons of space) can be rightly considered as highly innovative, the adoption of such metaphor is nothing new, as Blumenberg has shown in The Readability of the World (Blumenberg 2022) and is not problematic per se.

What in my view is much less endorsable is the implicit assumption, contained in the previous excerpt, that in history, or even in a single tradition, we can talk of one single book, or one single text, differently interpreted in different ways. It is this assumption which is at stake in the debate between functionalism
and substantialism, as well as in the very notion of secularization. Even if we consider it legitimate to treat historical events and epochs as texts to be interpreted, and even if we consider that in such interpretation we are always situated in a finite historical situation, never transparent to itself, which determines our interpretative acts, it remains totally undecided whether such a history of effects, metaphorically applied to history, is the history of one text interpreted in different ways, or of different texts. In other words, it is still undecided whether or not the historical process has to be considered as the process of one single entity, which passes through different transformations (interpretations), or of different entities, which have impact on each other while remaining clearly identifiable as distinct entities. This is the point lying at the core of Blumenberg's answer to Gadamer's review: and it is in this point where, in my reading, the notion of _Wirkungsgeschichte_ becomes, _nolens volens_, also a theory of historical conservatism (and historical substantialism).

I do not intend here to take a position about _who is right_: the idea of this essay is not to provide a theory of historical understanding, or even less an ontology of history. Rather, I would like to provide an interpretation of the assumption implied in the previously quoted passage, which, in my reading, constitutes the _hidden core of conservatism_ of Gadamer's hermeneutics. In this reading I intend to activate Blumenberg's notion of _background metaphorics_, as defined in his _Paradigms for a Metaphorology_:  

> Metaphorics can also be in play where exclusively terminological propositions appear, but where these cannot be understood in their higher-order semantic unity without taking into account the guiding idea from which they are induced and 'read off'. Statements referring to data of observation presuppose that what is intended can, in each case, be brought to mind only within the parameters of a descriptive typology [...] In undertaking an interpretive reconstruction, we will succeed inreviving such translations, which we propose to call 'background metaphorics'. (Blumenberg 2010, 62–3)

The notion of background metaphorics plays an important role in the second edition of LMA, as it is involved in the criticism of what above has been described as the explicative use of the notion of secularization. Such use, as already stressed, goes far beyond its descriptive use as detection of the loss of theological reference points, as it provides a much more specific statement about single events: but this specificity, according to Blumenberg, is only ap-

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7 For this notion and its role in Blumenberg's histories of metaphors as a heuristic tool for the Begriffsgeschichte see Betzler 1995, 461.
parently exactitude, as it is rather, the effect of the translation of the notion of secularization as illegitimate appropriation of a good, as typology applicable to different historical events. In its explicative usage, the term "secularization" provides thereby a pattern (typology) that plays a heuristic role while at the same time remaining hidden, and this is what leads Blumenberg to consider it as an instance of background metaphoricis. It is precisely this positioning in the background that creates the appearance of going without saying: the illegitimacy is implied precisely by the hidden presence of the metaphoric pattern within our interpretative frame. And this leads Blumenberg to propose the additional formula implicative metaphoricis:

"It is not the usage that is metaphorical but rather the orientation of the process of concept formation. A tightening up from a vague exhortative and lamenting usage to the definition of a typical process form makes the 'recollection' of the historical legal proceedings appear almost inevitable. This is an instance of what I have tried to describe as "background metaphoricis," a process of reference to a model that is operative in the genesis of a concept but is no longer present in the concept itself, or may even have to be sacrificed to the need for definition, which according to firm tradition does not permit inclusion of metaphorical elements. One could also speak of implicative metaphoricis. (Blumenberg 1983, 22–3)"

The thesis endorsed herewith is that in the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte, as employed by Gadamer in his theory of understanding, a background metaphoricis is in action. More specifically, the history of effects is implicitly understood as the effect of the reception of one single entity in different historical and cultural contexts, as it happens in the original domain of the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte, namely the interpretation of texts. Such a background metaphoricis is, so to speak, inadvertently brought in the foreground in the previously quoted passage, where, in order to clarify our being involved in traditions, Gadamer argues that "Similarly, the philologist dealing with poetic or philosophical texts knows that they are inexhaustible." The supposed continuity of tradition, and continuity between traditions, is thereby understandable as an effect of the background metaphoricis, where in the history of effects a single text is always recognizable as an identifiable single entity beyond its different interpretations.

There is a last point I would like to make: in The Theory of Communicative Action, originally published by Habermas in 1981, we can find the following remark relating to Gadamer's notion of understanding:

Gadamer gives the interpretive model of Verstehen a peculiarly one-sided twist. If in the performative attitude of virtual participants in conversation we start with the idea that an author's utterance has the presumption of rationality, we not only admit the possibility that the interpretandum may be
exemplary for us, that we may learn something from it; we also take into account the possibility that the author could learn from us. Gadamer remains bound to the experience of the philologist who deals with classical texts [...]. The knowledge embodied in the text is, Gadamer believes, fundamentally superior to the interpreter's. (Habermas, 1984, 134)

In this excerpt, Habermas does not make use of Blumenberg's notion of background metaphors: but to state that Gadamer "remains bound to the experience of the philologist" suggests a similar diagnosis. In this essay it will remain open whether the transmission of a single text, as the original domain of the notion of Wirkungsgeschichte, not only plays a role in the characterization of our being inscribed in traditions, but more generally of the notion of understanding, thereby becoming a sort of encompassing metaphorical background of Gadamer's hermeneutics. What I intend rather to stress is that, even if in this case, such a role won't reduce Gadamer's hermeneutics to a conservative or reactionary one, as it coexists with other elements, starting for the dialogical characterization of the act of understanding, which goes against such conservative trait: not only as it explicitly enables amendments of traditions, as rightly stressed by Warnke, but also as it implicitly makes space for historical discontinuities. In this respect, we could say that the notion of the "classical", as the ultimate background metaphors of Gadamer's hermeneutics, constitutes both its progressive and conservative nucleus. On the one side, exemplifying a radically open notion of interpretation consisting in a dialogical process between interpreter and text; on the other side, implicitly making our relation with the past, whether textual, cultural or historical, a question of inscription in a continuous (as referring to one single entity, always recognizable beyond and behind the multiplicity of its interpretations) process of reception, thereby risking an a priori delegitimation of any effort to detect discontinuities in it. Which is, it seems to me, the very core of Blumenberg's critique of the notion of secularization, including his critique of the defense mounted by Hans-Georg Gadamer.

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References


